What's behind the arrests of Taiwanese Yiguandao members in China?
Arrests point to a renewal of religious persecution by the CCP
The recent arrests of Taiwanese Yiguandao (I Kuan Tao) members in China shortly before the elections in Taiwan should bring more attention to shifts in China's religious policy as well as the history of religious policy in Taiwan.
Yiguandao is the largest religious movement on Taiwan outside of mainstream Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Islam. Strictly-speaking it is not a single organisation but a collection of autonomous lineages with their own temple networks, although there is an umbrella organisation.
Along with similar Chinese sects considered as folk religion, " "salvationist" or of a generally Confucian nature, it is considerably older than Falun Gong and likely has a bigger following and is more influential in Taiwan and the Chinese Diaspora. It also has Japanese and Korean adherents, and has spread to the West. However, outside of religious scholars, most people in the West will not have heard of it despite its presence in Chinese communities.
This can be seen here in the Holy Glory Temple of the Baoguang lineage. This 2017 video of a prayer ceremony also shows Tsai Ing-Wen attending - it is common for politicians to attend Yiguandao and other religious groups' events.
The roots of Yiguandao is in the long tradition of Chinese folk religion, which at times had a contentions relationship with state power. Before 1949, Yiguandao developed a mass following but was outlawed and persecuted by both CCP and KMT regimes. This followed a consistent pattern in Chinese history: some religious were treated favourably or left alone by the regime in power, while those perceived as a potential threat were persecuted.
The KMT regime thus did carry out religious persecutions, but gradually retreated and abandoned such a policy. Reforms in Taiwan led to the lifting of such restrictions by the 1980s, after which Yiguandao and other religious movements began to expand in both adherents, infrastructure and influence. In common with many East Asian religious movements, this also included expansion abroad with large Diaspora communities and proselytisation.
In China, the post-1976 easing of some restrictions led to something of a religious revival, which included folk religion and qigong. The initial tolerance of this gave way to crackdowns and proscriptions. Yiguandao and other sects had already been banned, and a list of xie jiao (“evil cults” or “heresies”) was drawn up. Not because such groups were “heretical” or “evil”, but because they were perceived as a threat to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. This covers Falun Gong, Church of Almighty God and various other movements, and can also be seen as extending to underground Catholics and (Protestant) house churches.
Is it a coincidence that Chinese authorities arrested Taiwanese Yiguandao members prior to the elections and a time of considerable international strife? I suspect not: it signals a shift in how the CCP conducts religious policy, specifically pertaining to Cross-Strait relations. Taiwanese business and religious elites cultivated contacts on the Mainland and engaged in dialogue. This did not end the proscriptions on religious sects, but probably led to a limited tolerance of sorts. Unless, of course, the CCP perceives Yiguandao as an ongoing threat given the large following it enjoys in Taiwan and the Diaspora.
More people in the West will have heard about Falun Gong than Yiguandao. The persecution of Falun Gong and other movements has been widely publicised. The much older Yiguandao may not have been on the radar of the CCP in recent times, but has likely reappeared on its radar due to its Taiwan base. Taiwan-based religious movements which have cultivated an underground following in China are likely to face a new phase of persecution.