The meaning of flags

Russian aggression against Ukraine has created an identity crisis among Russians manifesting itself in symbolism rooted in history

When tyrannical regimes are overthrown, one of its most obvious manifestations is the adoption of symbolism to reflect the rejection of the regime. Very often this symbolism is rooted in nostalgia, or otherwise in a (sometimes selective) appropriation of history.

When Communism fell throughout Eastern Europe, nations reembraced their identities, traditions and symbols in a way that does not sit comfortably with contemporary Western liberal sensibilities, which since World War II has looked down upon this sort of nationalism. But this is precisely the dividing line between Western and Eastern Europe historically and culturally.

Similarly, uprisings in Libya and Syria saw use of the flags associated with previous regimes, as a rejection of the Gaddafi and Assad regimes and the ideologies they represent. The Diasporas of Iran, Laos, Vietnam and China fly their traditional flags to represent rejection of the regimes ruling their countries today. Portuguese and French monarchists prefer their traditional flags and symbols, but have been careful not to disrespect those of the republics today.

Belarus briefly adopted the nationalist white-red-white flag following independence in 1991. However, once Lukashenko was in power, they reverted to what was virtually Soviet symbolism as a Soviet-style dictatorship was imposed, making Belarus a virtual Soviet time warp and colony of Russia. It’s no different to what has happened to Lebanon under the occupations of Syria and Hezbollah in being a sovereign state in name only.

With this you begin to understand Ukrainians much better, especially as they have been victims of genocide by the Soviet Union. Had pro-Russian forces consolidated power, they would have turned Ukraine into the very kind of Soviet time warp that Belarus has become. Ukrainians don’t want that, and that’s why they are fighting to preserve their independence and identity.

But onto Russia now. You may have noticed that the anti-war movement has adopted a new flag to represent what they hope will be a “new” Russia. The flag is a white-blue-white flag, which is meant to symbolise “peace” - because they feel the present white-blue-red national flag is irredeemably tainted by Russian imperialism and brutality. Of course, the same can be said for Soviet flags which are also flown by advocates of Putinist imperialism, since their goal is to recreate the Soviet empire.

There is also an attempt to root the peace flag in a historical narrative - namely, being the colours of Novgorod, a Russian state which rivalled the Muscovite state before ultimately being defeated by it. As it goes, the said Muscovite state (Ukrainian, Belarusian and other nationalists in the region also use the term “Moscow Horde”) which became the modern Russian state, represented the aspect of “Russianness” that they have now come to reject. Novgorod, on the other hand, is taken as representing an alternative form of being Russian. This is not entirely without parallels in other countries where wars over history are a national pastime.

The Russian imperial flag of black-gold-white is commonly used by right-wing Russian nationalists and monarchists, including those who oppose the Putin regime and its disastrous war in Ukraine. The nationalist movement in Russia has been a target of FSB operations: parts of it have been coopted into supporting the regime, while those who oppose the regime have been marginalised, emigrated or in some cases have been imprisoned. This group also includes the traditionalists in the Diaspora who remain unreconciled to the Putin regime - some of whom also happen to live in Ukraine and have been impacted by the war. (See Metropolitan Agafangel in Odessa for example) The common thread is that these people see the present Russian state as illegitimate, as a rebranding of the Soviet system.

While Western media likes to describe the mainstream opposition to Putin as “liberals”, the reality is that even liberal and left-wing opposition to the Putin regime in Russia is far from being “liberal” in the contemporary Western sense of the term. Even if they are for liberal democracy and reform, they are certainly not contemporary social and cultural liberals.

More to the point, none of the Russian opposition currents above differ radically from the Putin regime in their view of the Russian sphere. Specifically, they do not differ on certain foreign policy and nationalities questions. The war has created a greater sense of alienation among non-Russian ethnic groups within Russia, who know that the regime is progressively eviscerating the pretense of being a federal republic. The use of ethnic minorities as fighting fodder is bound to add to the sense of resentment.

Hence, the use of a new flag by peace activists has been met with cynicism by ethnic and regional activists, and also from neighbouring countries. There is a deep distrust of the Moscow-centred opposition by ethnic and regional activists, who believe opposition programmes fail to meet their demands. The ethnic movements find no agreement with the various opposition currents (liberal-democratic, nationalist-monarchist and socialist) on this issue.

The idea that Russia needs to be broken up to prevent a repeat of the Ukraine war is one that may already be entering political discourse outside Russia. Within Russia and among its Diaspora, Russians are exploring identities conditioned by the above political movements (see Cossacks for one). Given the deep distrust of Russia among most of Central and Eastern Europe, the ethnic movements may yet find a more sympathetic constituency.