How will it end for Putin and Russia
Vladimir Putin's lack of a succession plan bodes ill for Russia
The ongoing war in Ukraine has still not answered the question on the lips of many Russia watchers: what happens when Vladimir Putin’s time is up, however that may come?
One thing is certain: Russia will not have a smooth transition after Putin. And the breakup of Russia on ethnic and regional lines is a distinct possibility. Srdja Trifkovic and Michael Rubin have written on this issue. Namely, that Putin has no succession plan: he is neither grooming a successor, nor is he leaving anything prepared for whoever might replace him.
Putin is not like Franco, whatever some misguided “traditionalist” types (I’ve encountered them on social media) like to think. Rather, he is more comparable to Salazar (Portugal) and Castro (Cuba). All three built a political structure reliant in some way on their persona, without believing it necessary to prepare a successor or prepare their countries for their departure from power. As a result, the Estado Novo regime in Portugal crumbled with virtually no resistance six years after Salazar’s departure from power. And six years after Fidel Castro’s death, Cuba and the Cuban Communist Party is in crisis, which saw protests break out last year.
Spain and Mexico had a completely different process of managed transition. Juan Carlos became King of Spain upon Franco’s death, and Spain became a constitutional monarchy as it had been prior to the Spanish Republic’s establishment in 1931. Mexico was ruled by PRI until 2000, maintaining power through stage managed “elections” throughout that period, but also broadly tolerant of political opposition which gave rise to the description “Perfect Dictatorship”.
In both countries, the transition was carefully managed by the elites in power without altering the fundamentals of state power established. In Spain, this was made abundantly clear during the recent Catalonia crisis. They were able to do this because of historical memory (both the Francoist regime and PRI were established following civil wars) and control of the state machinery, and a monopoly on force of arms.
The Spanish and Mexican armies were ideologically homogenised and subordinated to the state, which meant there were no serious threats to the regime’s power. Cuba has a similarly ideologically “pure” military loyal to the party and revolution, but that didn’t prevent Castro from having Arnaldo Ochoa executed on trumped up charges because he was seen as a threat.
It was a different situation in Portugal. Salazar never had the full loyalty of the armed forces, which was far more factionalised and ideologically diverse, producing no few ambitious officers in its ranks. Furthermore, the armed forces had been a player in politics since the 19th Century, its involvement directly or indirectly spanning some 150 years. The 1974 coup which ended the Estado Novo or Second Republic was entirely consistent with that tradition.
The only certainty here is that Russia faces uncertainty when the Putin Era ends, and Russians (not least the elites) know it.