Echoes of history in discussing the future of Russia
Competing visions, fighting forces and Western responses
Like many conflicts, the war in Ukraine throws up things which challenge conventional wisdom. Take for instance the idea that the regime of Vladimir Putin represents “conservative” and “far right” ideologies. This is emphatically rejected by many European conservatives, yet believed by many (especially American) liberals.
These same liberals impose their assumptions on Russia’s embattled opposition forces: are they really brave normie liberals fighting for the same values now being “enjoyed” in Western democracies? Truth turns out to be far more uncomfortable for most outside of those well acquainted with the subject.
Latvia-based frelance journalist Leonid Ragozin wrote an article recently about the identity crisis facing Russia’s opposition and the emergence of more radical opposition groups. I note that the writer has an ideological bias which I do not share, and that the article has failed to cover some important grounds about the emergence of these movements, specifically historical grounds.
Attention has been centred on the emergence of a Russian unit fighting on the Ukrainian side in the war, known as the Russian Volunteer Corps. The reason it has garnered attention is not so much for being Russians fighting on behalf of Ukraine, or for actions they have taken in the conflict, but for its ideology which is described as far right Russian nationalism.
RVC can be seen as a military expression of right-wing nationalist and monarchist opposition to the Putin regime, many of whose activists are jailed or exiled, and who continue to articulate fierce opposition to the war in Ukraine. Ragozin notes that the ambiguities surrounding Russia’s mainstream opposition figures - Navalny, Kasparov, Khodorkovsky, Ponomarev, Roizman, etc - may be creating the vacuum which more radical opposition groups can fill.
Ragozin also notes the fact that national minorities in Russia have developed separatist movements, gathered in the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum, which hosted a meeting in the European Parliament sponsored by the national conservative ECR Group (which includes the governing parties of Poland, Italy and Czech Republic), attended by politicians and think tank figures from both sides of the Atlantic.
In dismissing the majority of ethnic national movements as marginal, Ragozin did acknowledge movements such as those of Chechnya and Circassia (I would add to that Tatarstan) as having some traction. But his dismissive attitude aside, a major letdown in the piece was the failure to analyse the deep historical roots of the right-wing nationalist and monarchist opposition, as well as ethnic nationalist movements whose goal is the dissolution of the Russian Federation.
The Russian and non-Russian nationalist movements may have opposing views on the shape of Russia’s future, but they share in common the most hardline anti-Communist and anti-Putin stances, informed by their deep historical roots. They reject the Russian Federation as an illegitimate state which is no more than a rebranded Soviet Union, and also believe Russia never underwent Decommunisation or Desovietisation (which can also be called lustration). They have a negative view of the Soviet era, in contrast to the official Russian narrative regrettably believed by a large section of the populace. Their approaches are different, but they have a common goal in dismantling of what they view as a corrupt and illegitimate system.
The right-wing Russian nationalist opposition roots itself in the traditions of Tsarist Russia, the White Movement and emigration. Many use the Russian imperial colours and flag of old. One group, known as ANS, identifies with the anti-Bolshevik Left and uses the green and black colours. The Right opposition has political, religious (True Orthodox churches) and now military wings.
The ethnic nationalist movements, on the other hand, find roots in independence movements during the Russian Civil War and resistance to conquest by the Russian Empire in the 19th Century and before. National sentiments were revived as the Soviet system was collapsing in the late 1980s.
That ethnic national movements find a degree of sympathy in Poland, Ukraine and other countries in the region should be no surprise either. This is rooted in the ideals of Prometheism promoted by interwar Poland, which aimed to support liberation movements of nations under Soviet rule. This discourse has is now enjoying a revival.
In fairness, the question of which competing vision for Russia’s future assuming they lose the war in Ukraine remains open. Vladimir Putin is neither grooming an heir or leaving anything prepared for a successor, which will make intra-elite competition ugly. Already there are signs of this entering its preliminary stages. Is a diverse and fragmented opposition in any position to affect change and realise their goals? Neither they nor Western nations have yet devised a strategy to deal with these questions. But any resolution to the war will make discussion of this necessary.